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Abstract
Many developing countris now actively solicit foreign investment, offering
income tax holidays, import duty exemptions, and subsidies to foreign firms.
One reason for subsidizing these firms is the positive externalities as foreign
technology is transferred from foreign to domestic firms. This paper employs
a unique firm-level dataset to test for such dynamic externalities in the
Moroccan manufacturing sector. We find no evidence of positive
externalities, although the dispersion of productivity is smaller in sectors
with more foreign firms. Using detailed information on quotas and tariffs,
we also reject the hypothesis that the lack of such dynamic externalities
occurs because foreign investors are attracted to protected domestic sectors.
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I. INTRODUCITION
1.01 The disappearance of non-equity sources of foreign capital in the 1980s has
created a renewed interest in direct foreign investment (DFI). Despite the controversies
surrounding the benefits and costs of DFI, a number of developing country governments
have now changed their policies from restricting towards promoting foreign investment.
Some countries have actually tilted the balance towards foreign firms by offering special
ircentives: in Mexico, the macquiladora firms pay no income taxes; in much of the
Caribbean, foreign firms receive income tax holidays, import duty exemptions, and subsidies
for infrastructure. Are these subsidies justified? One benefit often cited in the literature
on the gains from DFI, apart from the enhanced capital inflows and increased employment,
is the positive externalities generated to domestic firms from the new technology or
additional know-how brought in by foreign firms. If foreign firms introduce new products
or processes to the domestic market, domestic firms may benefit from the more rapid
diffusion of new technology. In some cases, the demonstration effect may be sufficient to
stimulate technology diffusion. In other cases, diffusion may occur from labor turnover as
domestic employees move from foreign to domestic firms. If this pcsitive externality is not
completely captured by the incoming firms, it could justify some type of subsidy. This may
be the rationale for government policies in economies as diverse as Taiwan and Bulgaria,
which target special treatment for foreign firms in high technology sectors.
1.02 Despite the voluminous literature on DFI in the 1960s and 1970s, the empirical
evidence on dynamic externalities from foreign sources of equity investment remains slim.
Although a number of descriptive case studies have documented the importance of foreign
investment for domestic technology development (see, for example, Rhee and Belot (1989)),
few researchers have attempted to measure these effects empirically. In an early study,
Caves (1974) tested for the impact of foreign presence on value-added per worker in
Australian domestically-owned manufacturing sectors. Caves found that the disparity
between (higher) foreign and domestic value-added disappears as the foreign share of
sectoral labor rises, which is consistent with positive externalities from foreign presence.
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However, this relationship could also be observed if foreign firms invested more in capital-
intensive sectors, leading to higher value-added per worker in foreign-dominated sectors.
1.03 Globerman (1979) replicated Caves' findings (1974) using sector-level, cross-
section data for Canadian manufac*uring industries in 1972. Globerman, however, was able
to control explicitly for capital intensity in his estimation of value-added per worker. The
results indicate only a weak effect--none of the proxies for foreign presence in the sector are
significant at the 5 percent level. These results should call into question the positive effects
identified by Caves (1974), who did not control for capital intensity.
1.04 Even if no positive effects were identified in Canada or Australia, it is still
possible that dynamic externalities from foreign investment do occur in industrializing
countries. Most of the empirical work on dynamic externalities from foreign investment in
developing countries has focused on Mexico. which gathers manufacturing data by ownership
type. Blomstrom and Persson (1983) reproduce Globerman's study using 1970 census data
for 215 Mexican manufacturing industries. Controlling for capital intensity, scale effects, and
worker quality, Blomstrom and Persson find that labor productivity is significantly higher in
sectors where foreign firms employ a higher share of the labor force. Blomstrom (1986) and
Blomstrom and Wolff (1989) extend the analysis of Mexican data to examine the impact of
foreign presence on the dispersion of productivity and on the growth rate of total factor
productivity (TFP).' Using sector-level data, Blomstrom (1986) finds that an increase in
foreign presence fails to increase productivity growth, while Blomstrom and Wolff (1989)
find faster productivity growth and faster convergence ot productivity levels in sectors with
higher levels of foreign ownership.
1.05 This paper. which examines the impact of foreign investment on firms in
Morocco's manufacturing sector from 1985 through 1989, contributes to this existing
1/ Blomstrom ( 1989) provides a synthesis of his previous work on the impact of foreign
investment in Mexico.
literature in two respects. First, this is the only study that employs data at the level of the
individual firm over several years. Consequently, we are able to compare explicitlv the
behavior of foreign and domestic firms by sector, controlling for firm-specific attributes such
as size. The panel nature of the data (which combines cross-section and time series) allows
us to go beyond cross-section analysis comparing partial productivity measures (such as labor
productivity) across different firms Our results suggest that forei.,n firms exhibit higher
levels of total factor productivity, but their rate of productivity growth is lower than that for
domestic firms. At first glance, this would appear to support the catch-up hypothesis--
domestic firms, at lower initial levels of productivity, are able to increase efficiency at a
faster rate. However, our tests on the presence of any dynamic externalities from foreign
presence show that although domestic firms exhibit higher levels of productivity in sectors
with a larger foreign presence, they do not exhibit higher productivity growth in those
sectors.
1.06 Second, we are able to use detailed information on the level of quota and tariff
protection to test whether the lack of any dynamic exterpalities stems from a tendency of
foreign firms to nmove towards protected sectors. We do not find evidence of such positive
externalities in either the protected or unprotected sectors.
1.07 Section 11 discusses the trade and foreign investment policies in Morocco
before and during regulatory reform in the 1980s. Section III examines the relative
performance of domestic firms and foreign firms. Section IV measures the positive
externalities of foreign presence on the level, growth rate, and dispersion of productivity for
domestically-owned firms. This section also extends the analysis to examine whether
dynamic technology externalities are related to the degree of import protection. Section V
concludes with a discussion of the implications of these findings for policies towards multina-
tionals.
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II. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOREIGN INVESTMENT
AND TRADE POLICY
2.01 Foreign investment policies. The first major action against foreign investment
in Morocco took place in 1973, when the government passed the Morocconization Decree,
which restricted foreign ownership of certain industrial, commercial, and service activities to
no more than 49 percent. The main purpose of this policy was political rather than
economic--to reduce the dominant role of French firms in the Moroccan economy. Activities
falling under the Morocconization law included textiles, clothing, footwear, leather products,
travel goods, toys, and wine. Most important, the law extended to such export-oriented
branches of manufacturing as leather tanning and finishing, fish canning and preserving,
fertilizers, edibie oi!s, vegztable fibers, and processed fruits and vegetables. The negative
impact of this law on foreign investment is evident from the fact that even enterprises not
subject to the law voluntarily handed over their capital share to their Moroccan partners.
2.02 A major reform of the investment code was undertaken in 1983. It allowed
full foreign ownership of Moroccan companies in certain sectors (especially manufacturing),
eased restrictions on the repatriation of capital and dividends, and introduced fiscal and
other incentives for direct foreign investment. The code guaranteed (i) foreign inve-tment
against the risks of nationalization and expropriation; (ii) unlimited transfer of dividends and
profits to foreign investors; and (iii) the repatriation of foreign investors' capital and related
capital gains. By 1985, the Moroccan majority-ownershWp restriction no longer applied to any
segment in the "dustrial sector, which meant that foreign firms could have an equity
participation of more than 49 percent. The investment code was further liberalized in 1988,
administrative procedures governing the approval of direc. foreign investment were simpli-
fied. and rules similar to those granted nonresident foreigners were extended to nonresident
Moroccans.3'
The following types of foreign investment became permissible without the prior
authorization of the Exchange Office: partic 4pation in the equit' of capital of a
company being established; subscription to the capital increase of an existing
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2.03 Trade policies. Following independence in 1956, Morocco's economic
development strategy was primarily based on import-substituting industrialization and
agricultural self-sufficiency in a highly protected domestic market. For more than two
decades, trade and industrial policies in Morocco were based on high tariffs and on
quantitative restrictions on imports. Furthermore, during the 1970s, the Moroccan
government expanded growth through high levels of public spending, financed through
foreign borrowing and rising receipts from phosphate exports. This culminaterd in a major
payment crisis in 1983. As a result, the government introduced outward-orienced structural
adjustment measures designed to eliminate the bias against export activities, liberalized the
import regi:-n, -- d enhanced the allocative role of the financial sector.
2.04 The trade reform introduced in 1983 called for the eventual elimination of the
Special Import Tariff (SIT), a uniform tariff levied on the c.i.f. value of imports, the lowering
of the maximum customs duty from 400 percent in 1983 to 60 percent in 1984 and 45
percent in 1985, and the reduction in quantitative restrictions. Changes in the industrial
code were also undertaken to promote exports. In Januarv 1988, the SIT and the custonms
stamp duty were merged into what was called a fiscal levy on imports, set at 12.5 percent.
Contrary to the declining maximum tariff trend observed since 1983, the fiscal levy actually
company; purchase of Moroccan securities; non-interest-bearing contributions to
partnership current accounts; purchase of real property: self-financing of construction
projects; creation or purchase of sole proprietorship; and operations to increase
capital through the capitalization of reserves, carry-overs, reserve provisions that have
become available, or the consolidation of partnership current accounts. Similarly,
operations involving the transfer of investments between foreigners no longer requires
the authorization from the Exchange Office. In addition. the banks were authorized
to transfer to nonresident fc,reign persons, without limit as to the amount or timing,
the income generated by the investments in Morocco, as well as the capital invested.
For further details, see IMF (1991).
In December 1989, the Morocconization Decree of 1973, which imposed a 49% limit
on foreign ownership of local enterprises, was eliminated for all sectors. Limits on
the share of foreign participation would, however, continue to apply in a few sectors
outside of manufacturing.
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exceeded the sum of the two abolished taxes. This was intended to generate additional fiscal
revenue rather than to provide protection.
2.05 Quantitative restrictions, the principal instrument of protection for dor.-estic
goods until 1984, were progressively dismantled. Many (but not all) goods were gradually
transferred from List B (imports requiring prior authorization to be imported) to List A
(imports requiring no prior authorization) beginning in 1983. List C, which included all
prohibited import items, was formally abolished in 1986.3'
2.06 In both its foreign investment and trade policies, Morocco took major steps
towards liberalization from 1984 through 1988. These changes in policy allow us to use the
relatively short time series available in the data to analyze the impact of foreign investment
on domestic firms across protected and unprotezted sectors.
XI Nevertheless, Morocco is still far from being an open economy. The tariff structure
remains complicated despite the lowering of the maximum tariff and the dispersion
of the tariff rates remains high, although significantly reduced in recent years.
Morocco'; tariff structure is such that tariffs rise with the stage of processing,
resulting in effective rates of protection that are considerably higher than nominal
rates. This effect is reinforced by the prevalence of quantitative restrictions (List B)
on product; at a higher stage of processing.
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III. COMPARATIVE BEHAVIOR OF DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN F'IRMS
3.01 Data for this paper are taken from the Moroccan manufacturing census, which
annually surveys all manufacturing firms with at least 10 employees or with sales revenue
exceeding 100,000 dirhams (for a description of the dataset used for this paper, see
Appendix I). The share of foreign investment in manufacturing for 1985 through 1989 is
shown in Table 1. Foreign investment averaged 15 percen; of total assets during the second
half of the 1980s. This average hides significant differences across sectors. In 1989, for
example, 35 percent of the electronics sector was foreign owned, compared to only 4
percent for basic metais. In addition, there were significant changes in foreign ownership
between 1985 and 1989. The share of foreign ownership in some sectors doubled (such as
in chemiicais) while in other sectors it fell by as much as 50 percent (beverages and tobacco).
3.02 Table 2 compares the relative performance of foreign and dormestically-owned
firms. Foreign firms are initially defined as all firms with foreign equity that exceeds 5
percent of the firm's assets. (We will examine alternative definitions of toreign ownership
later and find the results unaffected.) Relative performance is measured using the following
indicators: output per worker, exports as a perccntage of total sales, real wages, deviation
from overall norms in the sector for multi-factor productivity, and total factor productivity
growth (TFPG). Output per woiker is derived from total value of output divided by the
ratio of total value of labor remuneration to minimum wage, instead of dividing by the
number of workers. This approach allows us to adjust at least partially, for a different skill
composition among employees across firms. For example, if a foreign firm has very few
workers but pays them much more, due to their greater skill, this wiil show up in a greater
number of "efficiency" workers for that firm. Real wages are computed as the total value
of remuneration to workers divided by the number of employees. The derivation of multi-
factor productivity and TFPG are discussed in greaLer detail below.
3.03 Table 2 reports all performance measures using the ratio of foreign-firm
performance to domestic-firm perfor-mance. In c-'.imrn 1, the value of 2.0 for food produicts
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shows that output per worker for foreign-owned firms was twice as high as for domestic
firms. The difference in perfornwance is statistic.lly significant at the 5 percent level. The
first set of figures gives relative performance using the ratio of unweighted means for
domestic and foreign firms in each sector. Across all sectors, the unweighted means suggest
that foreign firms exhibited higher labor productivity, paid their workers higher wages, and
exported a higher share of their output as well.
3.04 One shortcoming with these unweighted averages is that they may simply
reflect the superior performance of foreigni firms due to their size. Most foreign firms in
Morocco tend to be large and capital intensive, leading to higher observed levels of labor
productivity. Since larger firms, in general, are more likely to export a higher share of
output, we are also likely to observe that foreign firms are more export oriented. On the
other hand, the majority of domestically-owned firms are smaller--so they are less likely to
export a high share of their output. In other words, using unweighted means leads to an
inappropriate comparison of larger foreign firms with smaller domestic firms. If we re-
calculate the figures in Table 2 to produce weighted means--with the weights given by total
sales--this allows us to compare domestic and foreign firms of similar sizes.
3.05 'I'he weighted rneans--shown in parentheses in Table 2--reveal a different story.
After controlling for firm size, foreign firms do not exhibit higher levels of labor productivity
or a greater outward orientation for most sectors, although they do continue to pay higher
real wages than domestically-owned firms pay. On average, foreign firms exhibited levels
of labor productivity and export shares in total sales that were only 70 percent of what was
achieved by domestic firms of similar size. We repeated the comparison between domestic
and foreign firms by explicitly dividing the sample into different size categories, but the
results did not change and, consequently, are not reported here.
3.06 One problem with using labor productivity is that it is at best a partial measure
of overall multi-factor productivity--which takes into account the combined productivity of
the firm when all inputs are included. How could such a measure be computed'? Using
- 9-
techniques available for panel datasets (which combine data across firms and over time),
Appendix II shows how it is possible to compute a firm-specific measure of multi-factor
productivity within each sector. As shown in Appendix 1I, such a measure is essentially the
remainder from a regression of value-added on labor and capital inputs.
3.07 The level of multi-factor productivity is usually examined relative to the level
achieved by the most efficient firm in each sector j. Given N firms, there will be N
estimated productivity measures within each sector j, given by &l,,.... Nj. We can now define
relative efficiency for a firm i as given by zij, where
(1) 6tj = max(fij)
zj= - k i = 1,2 ....... N for each sector j.
3.08 A high value of z;, (in absolute value) indicates that firm i is very inefficient
relative to the most efficient firm in sector j. Table 2 gives the ratio of z,, for foreign firms
relative to domestic firms. A ratio less than unity indicates that foreign firms are relatively
more productive than their domestic counterparts--since the deviation z,, from the best-
practice firm is low. Using both the weighted and unweighted means for the zi,'s of foreign
and domestic firms shows that, on average, foreign firms have achieved a higher level of
productivity.
3.09 What about the growth rate of productivity? Do foreign firms also dominate
in this respect? The last column in Table 2 shows the difference between total factor
productivity growth (TFPG) 4 in foreign and domestic firms. TFPG is not higher among
foreign firms. Nor is this particularly surprising. While we could expect foreign firms to
exhibit higher levels of productivity, their rate of growth of productivity is likely to be lower,
as domestic firms catch up to the higher level of productivity of their foreign counterparts.
4/ TFPG has been calculated here using the standard approach.
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3.10 One question that arises is: to what extent does minority-versus-majority
foreign ownership affect relative performance'? Table 3 compares the relative performance
of firms whose foreign participation exceeds 50 percent to firnis with minority foreign
participation--defined as from 5 to 49 percent. The results in Table 3 suggest that f -ms with
majority foreign ownership generally behave in the same way as firms with mino. .y foreign
ownership. Majority-owned firms do not exhibit higher levels of productivity, although they
do pay their workers somewhat higher wages and are slightly more outward oriented than
firms with minority foreign ownership.
3.11 In summarv, Tables 2 and 3 suggest that there are sorne differences in
behavior and performance between domestically-owned and toreigni-owned firms. Although
foreign firms do not geLnerallK exhibit higher levels of labor productivity or export
orientation, once we control t(or size otf firm, foreign enterprises do pay higher wages and
generally exhibit lower deviations tronm best-pr.actice InUlti-tactor productivity. It is
interestinlg to observe thaitt the sharie ot tore ign equlitV participation does not seem to affect
performance as TMlLCh: tirlls wit 1d ]ss th.al 50) percent tore-,gnl equity participation do not
hehave much ditter[l lltN 1romn Iil tOrim-owned ti;[Ciri' firlls.
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IV. PRODUCTIVITY DYNAMIC EXTERNALITIES
4.01 If the knowledge or new technology embodied in foreign firms is transmitted
to doinestic firms, we would expect to see evidence in the form of higher productivity levels
and growth rates for domestically-owned firms in sectors with a large foreign presence. This
section examines two different possibilities through which foreign presence could have a
positive externalities effect on domestic firm productivity. First, we examine the influence
of foreign presence on the dispersion of productivity levels, using a modified version of the
7; 's defined in (1). Second, we examine the influence of foreign presence on the growth of
productivity for domestically-owned firms.
4.02 Externalities in terms of productivity levels. The productivity levels calculated
earlier for each firm are only comparable across firms within the same sector, but not across
different sectors. Consequently, we cannot directly measure the impact of foreign presence
on the level of productivity across sectors. However, we can compare the deviation of firm
productivity from each sector's best-practice frontier. To normalize these residual
productivity terms requires one more step. Given N firms, there will be N estimated
intercepts within each sector j, given by & ... &N. We can now define
(2) di = max(&j;)
4, = (&il - &J)/ &J i = 1,2 ....... N.
4.03 Table 4 examines the impact of foreign investment (controlling for firm size)
on the dispersion of productivity according to the following equation
(3) 4, = f(DFI_Firm ,, DFI Sectori, SIZEij)
4.04 The Qi,'s defined above are used as the dependent variable--the deviation of
firm-level productivity from the sector's best practice frontier. We include, as independent
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variables, the share of foreign assets in each firm's total assets, the share of foreign firms in
the sector (as measured by firm assets), and a measure of firm size, proxied by the ratio of
firm sales to total sales for the largest firm in each sector. The positive and statistically
significant coefficient for the share of foreign investment in firm assets supports the earlier
results (see Table 3) that suggested that foreign firms exhibit less deviation from best-
practice productivity levels than do domestic firms. The positive and significant coefficient
on size also suggests that larger firms are rnore likely to achieve higher levels of productivity.
Finally, the sector-level foreign investment variable measures the impact of foreign presence
on the deviation of productivity levels from the best-practice frontier. The positive and
significant coefficient on sectoral foreign investment suggests a smaller deviation from
maximum productivity levels in sectors with a large foreign presence. One reason may be
that foreign firms induce greater competition. causing firms that cannot approach the best-
practice frontier to exit the industry.
4.05 To determine whether the lower dispersion of firm productivity in sectors with
a high foreign presence is due to increased competition or the more rapid diffusion of new
technology (or both) would require a more fully specified model. Nevertheless, we can gain
some insight by separatinig the sample into "high" technology and "low" technology sectors
and re-estimating the equations in Table 4. We defined the high technology sectors to
include machineiy, transport equipment, electronics, scientific instruments, and chemicals.
4.06 The results, which are given in Table 5, show that the influence of foreign
investment in reducing the dispersion of productivity was greatest in the low technology
sectors. This suggests that competition due to foreign investment was more important in
pushing firms towards the best-practice frontier than for the transfer of advanced technology.
4.07 Externalities in terms of productivitv growth. To examine whether foreign
presence affects the rate of productivity growth. we begin with a production function, with
value-added Y a function of two inpats. capital and labor:
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(4) Yij, = A1,1F(L,t,K1 x)
The level of productivity is given by Aj, which is assumed to vary across firms within each
sector j and across time t. If we totally differentiate this, take logs, and use the fact that the
value of the marginal product for each factor equals its cost, we now have
(5) dlogYij, = JAj^, + a,dlogLij, + a,dlogK11,
where Y is value-added, dA/A is productivity growth, and L and K are labor and capital,
respectively. The coefficients on the growth of labor and capital are simply their share in
value-added. We test the hypothesis that productivity growth is affected by the share of
foreign invest.nent both at the firm level and at the sector level by assuming that productivity
growth can be decomposed into the following components:
(6) dA,j!AJ,, = a DFI_Firm1 j, + b DLF_SectorJ, + c C, + d D,
where C, and D1 are sector and time dummies, respectively. Productivity growth varies
across sectors () and time (t) and also varies as a function of the level of foreign investment
in both firrns and sectors. The coefficient on DFI-Sector measures the so-called "positive
externalities" effect--the extent to which the presence of DFI increases the rate ot
productivity growth, after accounting for other factors. Combining (5) and (6) yields
(7) dlogYijt =
a DFI_Firmj1 1 + b DFI_Sectorj, + c C, + d D,+ a, dlogLi,, + ak dlogK,j,
4.08 The results are given in the first three columns of Table 6. Column (1)
excludes time and industry dumnmies, while column (2) only excludes industry dummies. The
results are not significantly affected by the inclusion of time or industry effects. At the firm
level, the impact of foreign investment is negative but statistically insignificant--indicating that
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firms with foreign investment did achieve lower growth rates of productivity, although not
significantly different from domestically-owned firms.
4.09 If domestic firms are increasing their productivity at a faster rate than foreign-
owned firms, could this catch-up be due to dynamic exAtrnalities from DFI? Table 6
provides various alternative specifications to test for evidence of positive externalities. The
share of foreign assets in total assets at the sector level is included as a right-hand side
variable: if foreign presence positively affects productivity growth for domestically-owned
firms, then the coefficient on DFI_Sector should be positive and statistically significant. The
sigil on DFI Sector is in fact negative in almost all specifications, although it is insignificant.
Columns (4) through (6) exclude all firms with foreign investment from the sample and test
for positive externalities from sector-level foreign investment on wholly domestically-owned
firms. Again, there is no evidence for positive externalities in terms of productivity growth.'
4.10 The lack ot evidence on positive dynamic externalities from foreign investment
could be due to distortions in the trade policy regime. If foreign firms are attracted to highly
protected domestic markets--seeking to exploit the rents from protection--then the results
presented above could sLiffer from the classic problem of omitted variable bias.
4.11 To examine the impact of protection on potential dynamic externalities from
foreign investment, the sample was split into two groups. Using three different measures
of protection, a "low" protection and a "high" protection group of sectors was identified. The
first measure of protection used was the average tariff level by 3-digit sector for those years
where it was available--1984, 1987 and 1988. The second measure of protection used was
the share of production under List A: the share of production not subject to quantitative
restrictions in each sector. The third measure was the change in the coverage of List A
We also separated the sample into 'low" technology and "high" technology sectors to
test whether spillovers might he concentrated only in high technology areas such as
electronic machinery, automobiles, etc. The results remained unchanged and,
consequently, are not reported here.
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between 1984 and 1988--i.e., the reduction in quotas on a sector-by-sector basis over the
period of trade reform.
4.12 The results are given in Table 7. The positive externalities--indicated by the
coefficient on DFI_Sector--remain insignificant and generally negative. However, the
coefficient does switch from negative (and statistically significant at the 15 percent level) to
positive (but insignificant) for sectors that had a large reduction in quota coverage. At the
firm level, one interesting result emerges. Using the level of tariffs and quotas as a measure
of protection, the results in columns (3) and (4) suggest that foreign firms only exhibited
lower productivity growth relative to domestic firms in protected sectors. In sectors with a
high level of quotas (column (4)), foreign firms exhibited lower and statistically significant
growth in productivity than domestic firms. Yet in sectors with low quota coverage (column
(3)), their rate of productivity growth became positive (but insignificant).
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V. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATION OF FINDINGS
5.01 Comparisons of performance between domestic and foreign-owned finns reveal
that, on average, foreign firms tend to be more export oriented and to pay higher wages.
Much of the differential in outward orientation between domestic and foreign firms is due,
however, to the fact that foreign firms tend to be relatively large. If size is controlled for,
we find that the difference in average outward orientation between foreign firms and
domestic firms of the same size is much reduced.
5.02 The results also show that foreign firms exhibit higher levels of overall multi-
factor productivity. However, the rate of growth of productivity is higher for their domestic
counterparts. The results show that this is due in part to the distortiorlary effects of
protection--foreign firms lag behind domestic firms in productivity growth primarily in
protected markets.
5.03 One major benefit often attributed to direct foreign investnient is thc positive
externalities of knowledge or new technology transfer t'rom t'oreign to domestic t'irms, U7sinig
a production-function approach, we test the hypothesis that toreign piresence is associated
with increased productivity in domestica v-owned firms. We tind evidence of dyn.amic
externalities from foreign investment that result in a smaller dispersion of productivity levels
across firms, making them move closer to the efficiency frontier. Hiowever, the evidence of
positive externalities from firms with foreign equity to whollv domestically-owned firms in
terms of productivity growth is weak at best. Altlhough domestic firms do exhihit taster
productivity growth, it cannot be attributed to dynamic externalities from foreign investment.
Nor is this conclusion affected when we explicitly control for variations in protection--often
a source of distortionary foreign investment.
5.04 Recent attitudes towards foreign investment in developing countries have
shifted as sources ot debt financing have diminished. Some countries provide su7bsidies to
foreign investors through tax holidays, import duty exemptions, provision of intrastructure,
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and other policy instruments. One rationale for special treatment stems from the dynamic
technology externalities that benefit domestic industry--dynamic externalities that are not
internalized in the foreign firm's rate of return. In the Moroccan case, the findings related
to the level and growth of productivity suggest that foreign presence has caused a one-time
increase in firms' efficiency, and therefore, the findings do not appear to support special
treatment.
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T ble 1: SHARE OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN MANUFAC IURING C
Annual hrsb oFDI
Year (perent)
1985 13
1966 15
1967 14
1968 15
1969 15
Sectoral shares
(percent)
Sector 1985 19S9
Food products 5 5
Other food 10 15
Beverages, tobacco 20 11
TCstiles 11 13
Apparel 21 23
Leather 16 21
Wood products 16 12
Paper products 27 18
Non-metallic minerals 16 17
Basic metals 4 4
Metal products 22 22
Machineiy 18 21
Transport equipment 23 25
Electronics 32 35
Scientific instruments 13 17
Chemicals 8 15
Rubber 17 14
Other manufactures 30 10
J/ Foreign share computed as a means of foreign share in total assets, weighted by firm
assets.
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Table 2: COWPARISOi OF PRODUCTIVITY, OUTWARD ORIENTATIOW, ANO WAGES BETWEEN DOXSTIC AND FOREIGN-OShED
ENTERPRISES IN IAIUFACTURING
(Values using weighted means in t)
Output Export
per as percent RaLI TFP TFPG foreign
worker of "tle, woae devictiona -TFPG domestic
Food products 2.0- (0.9) 15.2* (4.5) 2.3* (1.2) 0.7* (0.7) -6.4
Other food 0.5 (0.5: 2.0* (2.7) 1.2 (1.1) 1.0 (1.3) -7.3
Bverags, tobacco 1.4* (0.6) 10.8* (9.6) 2.2* (1.4) 0.9 (4.0) -7.0
TextiLes 1.1 (0.5) 1.5* (0.7) 0.9 (0.2) 0.9 (1.0) 0.0
AppareL 0.8 (1.1) 1.8* (1.1) 1.3* (1.4) 0.9 (1.0) -12.3*
Leather 1.1 (0.6) 2.3* (1.4) 2.0* (1.8) 1.0 (1.0) 0.3
Wood produc:s 1.2 (1.0) 8.5* (6.3) 1.6* (1.0) 0.8* (0.8) -64.7
Paper products 1.5' (0.6) 11.7* (30.7) 1.7* (1.3) 0.9* (0.4) 14.0
Non-metalhic minerals 2.3* (2.2) 6.1* (1.6) 1.9 (2.2) 0.7* (0.5) 4.4
Basic metals 1.0 (0.3) Q.2* (0.1) 1.9* (1.2) 1.3 (21.2) -0.3
Metal products 0.6 (0.5) 4.0* (2.3) 1.1 (1.1) 1.0 (0.8) -1.5
Machinery 1.1 (2.2) 5.0* (0.2) 0.8 (1.8) 0.9 (0.7) -1.8
Transport equipment 1.6* (2.0) 1.6 (0.4) 2.0* (2.1) 0.8* (0.7) 9.7
ELectronics 1.5* (1.3) 4.5* (3.9) 2.1* (2.0) 0.8* (0.8) 0.3
Scientific instruments 1.3* (1.7) 0.3 (0.1) 1.7* (1.8) 1.0 (1.1) 16.2
Chemicals 2.0* (0.6) 1 9* (0.0) 2.6* (1.8) 0.7r (1.9) 1.1
Rubber 0.9 (1.8) 4.2' (3.6) 1.5 (3.8) 0. 9* (0.8) -1.3
Other manufactures 0.9 (0.8) 0.6 (0.5) 0.6 (0.8) 1.1 (1.0) -21.3
ALl sectors 1.2 (0.7) 2.0* (0.7) 1.7* (1.3) 0.9' (0.9) -6. 7*
a. Ratio of enterprise performance for firms with at least 5 percent foreign ownership to firma
with less than 5 percent foreign ownership. A "*' indicates difference in means is statistically
significant at 5 percent Level for the unweighted means only.
b. Average deviation of foreign firm productivity from best practice frontier/ to average deviation of
domestic firm productivity. A value of Less than owe indicates less deviation from best practice
among foreign firms.
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TabJL 3: COWPAAISOY OF PRODUCTIVITY, OTWAtRD ORIEhTATIOM, AND WAGES ETWEEN MAJORITY- AND NItORITY-owmED
FOREIGM FIRNS
(Values usian weighted mans In )
Output Exports
per as percent Real TFP TFPG foreign
worker' of * $les wowes deviation0 -TFPG domstic
Food product 0.5' (1.0) 0.1* (0.2) 0.8* (1.0) 1.3* (1.7) -6.3
Other food 1.2 (1.0) 0.9 (1.1) 1.2 (1.0) 0.9 (0.1) -15.1
Seerae, tobacco 2.7r (2.3) - 3.6' (3.3) 1.4* (1.4) -13.3
Textiles 1.1 (1.4 1.3* (1.0) 0.9 1.1) 1.1 (.0) 1.3
Apparel 1.0 (1.6) 0.8' (0.9) 1.0 (1.1) 1.0 (1.2) 4.5
Lesther 0.7 (0.6) 0.9 (0.7) 0.8 (0.9) 0.8 (0.9) -72.4*
Wood products 0.9 v0.5) 1.0 (1.2) 1.2 (0.9) 1.0 (1.9) 2.6
Poper products 0.8 (0.9) 0.1* (0.1) 0.9 (1.0) 1.1 (1.1) -8.7
Non-metallic minerals 0.5* (0.5) 1.1 (5.2) 0. 7* (0.8) 1.2 (2.2) 7.9
Basic metals 0.3' (0.6) - - 1.0 (1.4) 1.6 (1.1) -1.5
Metal products 0.9 (0.7) 1.3 (8.2) 1.1 (1.1) 0.9 (1.4) 0.5
Machinery 0.9 (1.1) 1.6 (0.9) 1.0 (1.2) 1.0 (1.8) -13.3
Tranaport equipment 1.1 (3.0) 0.8 (2.0) 1.0 (1.3) 1.4* (0.2) 12.8
Electronics 1.1 (0.9) 1.1 (1.6) 0.9 (0.9) 0.9 (1.6) 3.9
Scientific instruments 0.8 (1.2) - 1.0 (1.2) 1.1 (0.7) 17.2
Chemicals 1.3* (1.4) 0.8 (0.3) 1.4* (1.2) 0.9 (0.9) -0.9
Rubber 1.5* (2.7) 1.5 (2.4) 1.4* (2.7) 0.9 (0.8) -9.4
Other menufactures 1.4 (1.2) - 1.3 (1.1) - - 77.1*
Total 0.9' (1.0) 1.1 (1.2) 1.1* (1.2) 1.0 (1.1) -2.5
a. Ratio of enterprise performance for firms with at least 50 percent foreign ownership to firms with Less than 50
percent but more than 5 percent foreign ownership. A"" indicates difference in means is statistically significant
at 5 percent Level.
b. Average deviation of foreigin firm productivity from best practice frontier/ to average deviation of domestic firm
productivity. A value of Less than one indicates Less deviation from best practice among foreign firms.
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Tdlb3 4: IMPACT OF FOREIGN OWNERSIP ON TIE LEVEL OF FIRM PROOUCTIVITY, DEFINED AS THE
DEVIATION FROM SECTOR-LEVEL EST-PRACTICE PERFORMANCE
Dependt variable: u4 AlL firm Non-OFI firm
Interc.,)t -. 441 -. 444
(.004) (.004)
DFI (firm) 0.030
(.008)
DFI (sector) 0.170 0.174
(0.019) (.022)
Size of firm 0.002 0.002
(0.00001) (0.0001)
N 3933 3105
R-square .16 .12
Note: Standard errors in 0.
TabLe 5: IMPACT OF FOREIGN OWNERSHIP ON THE LEVEL OF PRODUCTIVITY,
BY HIGH TECHNOLOGY AND LOW TECHNOLOGY SECTORS
Non-DFI firms
Dependent variabLe: u
High TechnoLogy Low Technolov
Sectors Sectors
Intercept -. 397 -. 448
(.020) (.004)
DFI (sector) 0.017 0.189
(0.082S (.024)
Size of firm 0.002 0.002
(0.0003) (0.0001)
N 410 2693
R-square .06 .14
Note: Standard errors in 0.
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Table: TESTIICG FR EXTERNALITIES FUI FOREIGN INVESTMENT FOR TNE
GRWTH OF PWDUCTIVITY
Dependmnt variable: Change in Log Y
All firm lon-DFI firm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
d (tog L) 0.773 .772 .770 0.772 0.770 .770
(.009) (.009) (.009) (.010) (.010) (.010)
d (tLog K) 0.088 0.090 .088 0.105 0.108 0.106
(.011) (.011) (.011) (0.013) (0.0t3) (0.013)
DFI (firm) -0.018 -0.019 -0.020 - - -
(.023) (.023) (.023)
DFI (sector) -0.037 -0.029 -0.039 .009 .0C1 -. 011
( .052) ( .01;2) ( .061) ( .063) < .063) ( .073)
Time dumies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Industry dLowies No No Yes No No Yes
R-r quare .41 .41 .42 .42 .42 .42
N 11,772 11,772 11,772 9,629 9,629 9,629
Note: Standard errors in 0.
DFI (firm) = share of firm's assets which are foreign owned.
DFI (sector) = share of DFI in each sector.
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Table : TESTING FOR EXTERNALITIES FROM FOtEIGN INVESTMENT FOR PRODUCTIVITY
GROWTH UNDER VARYINC TRADE REGIMES
Alt Firm
Dapendent variable: Change in tog Y
Tariffs Cuot" .oduction in awota
La iah LOW lith La
(1) (2) (3) C() (5) (6)
d (tog L) 0.753 0.764 0.723 0.777 0.781 0.761
(.025) (.016) (.023) (.016) (.012) (.013)
d (tog K) 0.077 0.069 0.061 0.077 0.081 0.097
(.035) (0.019) (.025) (.022) (.014) (.018)
DFI (firm) 0.003 -.043 0.039 -0.091 -.027 -0.004
0.053) (.041) (.044) (.047) (.028) (.039)
DFI (sector) -0.101 -0.034 -0.109 -0.086 0.014 -0.133
(0.117) (.111) (.107) (.113) (.066) (.085)
R-square .38 .38 .33 .41 .42 .40
N 1585 4212 2154 3643 6402 5370
Note: Standard errors in 0.
DFI (firm) = share of firm's assets which are foreign owned.
DFI (sector) = share of DFI in each sector.
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APPENDIX I: DESCRIPTION OF THE MOROCCAN INDUSTRIALDATA
The empirical analysis of the Moroccan industrial performance is based on firm-level
industrial survey data collected by the Moroccan Ministry of Commerce and Industry. The
data cover the period 1985 to 1989. The surveys are exhaustive and include all enterprises
with 10 or more employees, as well as enterprises with fewer than 10 employees and that
realized a sales revenue greater than 100,000 dirhams (approximately US$11,000 at the
average 1984-1989 official exchange rate). A firm's activity is described by a four-digit
Moroccan nomenclature of economic activities (Nomenclature Marocaine des Activitts
Economiques, or NMAE). which is often referred to as the nomenclature of national
accounting (Nomenclature de )a Comptabilitt Nationale, or NCN). Since intermediate inputs
were not available, it was necessary to use value- added in the production function instead
of total output. A capital stock measure was included only in 1988 as the total equipment
goods assets owned by the firm and was used as the benchmark to construct capital stock
for the remaining years using the perpetual inventory method forward and backward. Firms
that were not available in 1988 (the benchmark year) had to be omitted from the
productivity analysis. Libor input was expressed in terms of efficiency units (the total labor
cost divided by the minimum wage).
Looking at the patterns of major economic variables, we compare them across
different sectors in the manufacturing industry. In order to have a compliant analysis, the
original firm-level data were aggregated into 18 two-digit-level industries. Characteristics of
our sample are reported in Table A. 1 for 1987. In terms of the number of firms (column 1)
and the number for labor (column 2), the largest sectors are food products and textiles.
However, in terms of the share in manufacturing revenue (column 7), the chemical products
sector emerges as a major sector beside the other two. This is fully understandable given the
importance of phosphate in Morocco.
OUtpLut per worker (column 6) is the highest in relatively capital-intensive (see the
capital-output ratio in column 5) sectors such as basic metal and chemical products. By far,
- 26 -
the most export-oriented sector is clothing, which sells over 80 percent of its output abroad
(column 8). The other sectors that export are chemical products, which include the
derivatives of phosphate, and leather and shoes. As expected, import penetration (column
11) is high in intermediates and capital-goods producing sectors.
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APPENDIX II: CALCULATION OF MULTI-FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY
AT THE FIRM LEVEL
Imagine a production function, with value-added Y a function of two inputs, capital
and labor:
(1) Y11, = At F(jK 1Jt)
An ideal measure of the level of productivity would be an estimate of AX, which is assumed
to vary across firms within each sector j. Schmidt and Sickles (1984) have suggested a way
to estimate these firm-specific productivity measures by modifying standard techniques used
for panel data. We have the following model for each sector j (note that the subscript j is
suppressed and the variables are now expressed in logarithms):
(2) Y1, = a, + p'Xi, + E*,
where i = 1...., N and t = 1, ... , T. Yit is the value-added (in logarithm) for the i' firm at
time t, Xi, is a 2xN matrix of inputs, 6' is a 1x2 vector of constant parameters to be
estimated, and a, is a lxN vector of intercepts representing the effects of the variables
specific to the ith individual and invariant over time. The a, for each firm i is obtained by
including i dummy variables that take the value 1 for the corresponding i and 0 otherwise.
The error term ei, represents the effects of the omitted variables that are both time and
cross-sectional varying. We assume that ei, is characterized by an independently and
identically distributed random variable with mean zero and variance a'. Given these
properties of ei, the ordinary-least-squares (OLS) estimator of a and , in (3) is the best
linear unbiased estimator (BLUE):
(4) &i = Y, - 4i
(5) i = [Zit(X,-XI)(Yit-XJT] [Zit(X1 t-Xi)(Yi'-Yi)]
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where Y' = (1/T)E,Yi, and XY = (lfr)z,X,.
The computational procedure for estimating the slope parameters of this model does
not require that the dummy variables for the individual effects actually be included in the
matrix of explanatory variables. The variables can be transformed by subtracting from each
cross-se-.tional unit the mean of its time-series observations and then applying the least-
squaro.s method without the intercept to the transformed data:
(6) (Yit - Y) = (XI, - X*) + (eC, - 0
The estimates of the N intercept parameters can then be obtained as the means of the
residuals for each cross-sectional unit by using equation (4).
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